Abstract: In Just War Against Terror Elshtain articulates emotions whilst ridiculing others who allegedly privilege emotion over reason. This critique focuses on her use of the notion of 'tragedy'. Distinctions are crucial to Elshtain's argument, especially that between combatants and civilians; they are based on significance of intention. Elshtain seems uneasy, however, about a particular consequence of waging war: civilian deaths. She seeks refuge in the notion of tragedy to characterise them; this reveals the complexity of the question of responsibility, which she does not however seriously engage. As a result, Elshtain's reasoning ends up implying a well-meaning but violent imperialism.
Just War Against Terror is clearly a polemic. This leaves the academic critic in a difficult position. There are contradictions in Elshtain's argument and one could laboriously dissect them, but that -it seems to me -would miss the point. Although framed in the tradition of just war thinking, Just War Against Terror does not really obey the rules of academic argument. Its power, such as it is, is performative. If readers are moved by this book, this is due to its passionate rhetoric, not its tight argument. My critique, therefore, zooms in on a particular rhetorical move that may appear to be marginal but that is at the same time revealing: the use of the notion of 'tragedy' in the context of violence and in particular of civilian deaths. What interests me then is not the validity or otherwise of Elshtain's claims, but rather the implications of the way in which she seems to seek refuge in the idea of tragedy in view of the adverse consequences of using violence.
Just Distinctions
Just war thinking is, as the name suggests, in the business of justifying war. It develops from the attempt to reconcile the need to use force with Christ's non-violent teachings. As Elshtain points out, the question of how a Christian can take up arms 'animated the just war tradition'. 5 Elshtain notes that the 'presupposition of just war thinking is that war can sometimes be an instrument of justice; that, indeed, war can help to put right a massive injustice or restore a right order where there is disorder'. 6 Thus, just war thinking confronts the problem of injustice in the world which, it is claimed, may (only) be rectified by force; it does not deny the ethically problematic consequences of war but argues that war is nevertheless, under the circumstances stipulated, justifiable and even just.
'Making the right distinctions' is crucial, Elshtain argues. 7 She highlights in particular the significance of what is often referred to as 'discrimination' in just war thinking: the distinction between combatants, who may legitimately be targeted, and non-combatants, who may not.
Elshtain is concerned, however, by the impossibility of altogether avoiding deaths, including those of civilians, in war: the 'question of "collateral damage" should never be taken lightly.'
She emphasises that 'the United States takes this matter very seriously indeed' and that Again, intention is crucial to this assessment. Elshtain's argument is not about the fact of the killing of non-combatants, but about targeting them, about, in other words, intending to kill them. Driving this argument to its logical conclusion would mean to assert that intending to kill is worse than actual killing. So a planned attack against civilians that has not been executed would be morally worse than in fact, but unintentionally, killing civilians. When
Elshtain compares two sets of actual killings, she sees a clear difference in how the people in question came to be dead. The issue is not so much that three thousand civilians died on September 11 whilst they were peacefully minding their own business; for Afghani and Iraqi 6 'innocents' have surely been killed in much the same way by US and allied forces. It is that they were meant to be killed.
It is the insistence that the intention to kill civilians is the problem that lies behind Elshtain's complaint that it is 'both strange and disheartening to read the words of those distinction-obliterators for whom, crudely, a dead body is a dead body and never mind how it got that way.' 30 In other words, there is, in Elshtain's view, not merely a significant distinction based on who the dead were before they got that way -combatants or civilians -but also whether their deaths were intended or not. Her complaint against the terrorists is not only that they kill non-combatants -she acknowledges that so do, inevitably, US troops -but that they do so deliberately. Killing 'innocents' accidentally or even inevitably whilst targeting combatants or other appropriate military targets may be just; intending to kill them is not.
The Tragedy of Violence
It would appear then that the US and its military are in the clear: they do not intend to kill civilians and so there is no problem with the justness of their actions. Yet, even though killing civilians accidentally may be justified, Elshtain notes that 'every civilian death is a tragedy'. Terry Eagleton comments that '[i]n everyday language, the word "tragedy" means something like "very sad"' 33 and indeed that 'no definition of tragedy more elaborate than 'very sad' has ever worked.' 34 Thus, the only aspect of 'tragedy' that appears to be clear is that it is about something being emotionally upsetting. Elshtain's recognition of this is interesting in itself but, true to her assertion that how one feels about something should not interfere with 'serious thinking', she does not actually explore her own discomfort at the deaths she calls 'tragic'. Eagleton, however, also observes that 'surely tragedy involves more than this.' 35 Elshtain's comments on the tragedy of violence, then, draw attention to something more than that the deaths in question are sad, that someone somewhere will be mourning the dead. This impression is confirmed by the way in which Elshtain attaches the idea of tragedy to civilian deaths only. Soldiers' deaths, though surely sad for those who loved them, are not identified as tragic.
Elshtain's only further comments on tragedy take us back to the issue of intention. She argues that H. Richard Niebuhr 'would have cautioned us against calling September 11 a tragedy'. This is because '[u]sually when a true tragedy occurs -a flood roars through a canyon, for instance, and kills vacationers -there is no one to punish.' 36 Unlike acts of terror, the flood is not 'planned' or 'humanly willed'. 37 A tragedy, then, is marked by a lack of intentionality and will, possibly even of human agency, therefore removing it, significantly for Elshtain, from the realm of punishment. Yet, even though September 11 was not, in this view, a 'tragedy' (as it was planned), the deaths on that day were, according to Elshtain, 'tragic'. In fact, she claims that 'every civilian death is a tragedy'. 38 Presumably, Elshtain does not mean to say that every civilian death is caused by something like a flood roaring through a canyon. Indeed, if every civilian death is a tragedy, then 'tragedy' cannot depend on a lack of intentionality, the unavailability of someone to punish: civilians do get killed intentionally, and indeed Elshtain forcefully argues that those who died on September 11 did.
Elshtain's appeal to the notions of the 'tragic' and 'tragedy' is marked by an intriguing inconsistency. She presents an argument that, she claims, is all about pre-established criteria, about justice being 'measured', 39 about 'serious thinking'. 40 It is perhaps peculiar that these claims to rationality and indeed reasonableness are made quite so passionately, quite so much in anger. Yet what is truly interesting is that in places the pretence of reasonableness falls away -and tragedy comes to be invoked. Although civilian deaths in a just war are, according to her own argument, justified, although we can work this out rationally, her ethical framework apparently fails to satisfy even Elshtain herself. The horror of these deaths remains. Elshtain, in claiming that every civilian death is tragic, seems to depart decisively from the idea that tragedy involves a somehow exceptional catastrophe, she does perhaps aim to confer dignity in noting tragedy. I do not take these deaths lightly, she seems to say; I do acknowledge the catastrophe of these deaths, the victims' humanness, the irreplaceability of these lives.
The claim of 'tragedy', however, does more. It seems to place the terrible event beyond our responsibility. 'Tragic' suggests something like 'unintentional, yet upsetting'; beyond control; not part of the plan. Oedipus, after all, made a serious effort to avoid doing what was foretold, and yet he could not escape his fate. His patricide was both inevitable and in some sense accidental. Poole notes that 'our notions of tragedy are bound up with ideas about accident. "Tragedy" may connote inevitability and "accident" chance, yet somehow they are embroiled with each other.' 45 And this seems pertinent in relation to Elshtain's representation of civilian deaths in just war as tragic. They are indeed represented as on the one hand inevitable -after all, war will cause deaths -and accidental -the US does not intend them, in fact makes every effort to prevent them. As war, even just war, inevitably causes such deaths this is an acknowledgment of the damage the course of action she supports will do.
She seems to recognise that the dead are irreplaceable, that their deaths in some fundamental sense fail to make sense. These deaths are not necessary to what she represents as just, but inevitable in the context of it, and hence tragic. But these deaths are also tragedies waiting to happen in Poole's sense: they 'can be foreseen and prevented', 46 9 though he acknowledges Oedipus might not have agreed with this assessment, given that all his efforts to do so proved fruitless. In contrast, in Elshtain's rendering, if civilian deaths in the US 'war against terror' are 'tragic' -that is, like a flood roaring through a canyon -there is no one who can be held responsible, no one who may be punished, as long as the precautions of discrimination were taken and the deaths were therefore unintended, not willed. For Elshtain, what seems to set apart tragic events from others is indeed that there is no one to punish. In other words, blame cannot be assigned. Thus, the implication of Elshtain's argument seems to be that those in a just war may kill without having to accept responsibility -the 'war against terror' is like a flood roaring through a canyon -and yet her invocation of tragedy says otherwise; for the tragedy is that we are responsible even for that which we have not willed. The implication of calls for American withdrawal is that it is preferable to pull up stakes and leave a people beleaguered and vulnerable to terrorist exploitation.
The Tragedy of Responsibility
This strategy of abandonment, often justified as a way to respect culture's 'difference,' is actually a counsel of indifference. To abandon beleaguered peoples is to give them less regard than they deserve. At the conclusion of World War II, with all its attendant horrors, Hannah Arendt insisted that human dignity needed a 11 new guarantee. Providing that guarantee puts an enormous burden on those with power.
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Although Nicholas Rengger is keen to separate this imperial thinking from Elshtain's just war argument, 57 it seems to me that one actually follows directly from the other. If the innocent are to be protected from harm, as we define it, then there are countless opportunities for just war.
In other words, in Elshtain's argument, the US becomes the tragic hero that has an unwanted responsibility foisted upon it. There is no escape. Elshtain's argument implies the necessity of a well-meaning but violent imperialism. Yet it is not clear whether -much like a flood in a canyon -the US is not to blame for the destruction it wreaks in acting according to its fate or whether the tragedy in question is not one of being responsible -inevitably implicated -in that which one has not willed (but, in this case, knowingly accepted). By noting that which she is unable to absorb into her intellectual framework as 'tragedy', Elshtain opens the door to the complexity of life, without however thinking through what this means.
As Michael Dillon points out, tragedy is 'concerned precisely with the condition in which we do not and cannot know what is correct in advance, and with how, nonetheless, we creatively work-out and work with our disclosure in the truth of that condition in order to live the free manifold of life itself.' 58 Elshtain, in contrast, claims to know and hence sees ethical value in making things better for others. Such attempts at imposing control on a world that is perceived as dangerous and as not obeying her notions of what might constitute proper politics will inevitably entail a violent imperialism. In this Elshtain seems to me to deny the very humanness of those she claims to wish to protect. There is a tension between what she thinks ought to be and the world she believes she confronts; this, perhaps, accounts for her palpable frustration. That she opts to resolve this tension in favour of an imperial violence is the danger of Just War Against Terror and its tragedy.
